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  1. Evgeny Schwartz
  2. Children’s Theatre, Shvarts, and the Fairy Tale
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--The director, Nikolay. The Dragon [Evgeny Shvarts, Laurence Senelick] I think that Shvarts is becoming a literary classic. Dragon. Lancelot. Charlemagne - the. Books» Russian» Download The Dragon book - Evgeny Download PDF · Read online. The Dragon [Evgeny Shvarts, Laurence Senelick] I . Into this atmosphere, Evgeny Shvarts introduced The Dragon, a children's play that that fairy tales pdf. Access options available: HTML; PDF Download PDF .

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The Dragon By Evgeny Shvarts Pdf Download

The Dragon A fairy tale in three acts Characters: The Dragon. Lancelot. Charlemagne – the archivist. Elza – his daughter. The Burgomaster. Heinrich – his son. By Eugene Schwartz. “The Dragon” is a play written by the Russian writer Eugene Shwartz in , when the war was on and the fates of the entire world hung. The Naked King, the Shadow and the Dragon book. Read reviews from world's largest community for readers.

List of illustrations Figure 1. Talk of globalisation sometimes presumes that the nation will fade away as organisations and individuals build for themselves new networks which by-pass the commonalities and loyalties expressed in the idea of the nation. Nationalism, too, whenever it is that various writers have supposed it to have 'risen', has been held to have been an unmitigated disaster, at least when it has been accompanied, as it not infrequently has been, by virulent xenophobia and intolerance. In the twentieth century there were significant attempts to restrain or circumvent the influence of nationalism by creating international or supranational structures and agencies. On the other hand, it is apparent that the nation has not in fact faded away and, despite the surge of new nations, or at least new states, in the second half of that century, there remain across the contemporary world communities which feel themselves to be nations, or are in the process of becoming nations, and who see in the attainment of statehood a legitimate, desirable and beneficial goal. In other contexts, too, old nations reaffirm themselves as necessary carriers of individuality and distinctiveness in a world threatened by homogeneity. It is asserted that the nation remains the essential building block in the structure of the contemporary world. Nationalism need not be vicious. Nations can and do speak peace unto nations. It becomes clear, however, reading references of 'narrow nationalism' on the one hand or 'national liberation' on the other, that how particular nations come to exist or be defined remains obscure and contentious. This series revisits these issues in the light of extensive debates about national identity which have been conducted over recent decades by historians, anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists in particular. To speak of 'Inventing the Nation' picks up one of the interpretations which has gained favour, or at least excited interest. Influential writers have seen 'invention' viii Preface taking place in Europe in the 'springtime of the nations' at the dawn of 'modern' history, though their explanations have varied. Others, however, have regarded 'invention' with some suspicion and identify a medieval if not primordial 'nation'.

New Republic. Kremlin Russia. Interestingly, the security services, followed by the Russian government, were considered the most trusted institutions that should be responsible for regulation and censorship. Center for Global Communications Studies.

North Korea. Public opinion and multistakeholderism in Internet governance One of the dominant approaches in Internet governance suggests that if institutional actors try to increase the degree of regulation in accordance with their own interests, the community of users will exercise its voice in order to prevent this.

In other words, the possibility of a balance of power between the different actors involved in Internet governance is suggested. The idea of multistakeholderism as a governance framework relying on the involvement of various actors is based on this assumption, which also suggests that the public is one of the stakeholders in Internet governance.

Accordingly, the clash between the public interest and the interests of governments should lead to a compromise-based policy. In this light, we should ask two questions. The first is whether users are able to exercise their voices in general and within authoritarian environments in particular. The second is whether the user community has any independent voice to exercise. The data from Russia suggests that an independent user voice scarcely exists, and based on this data, one might not expect the community of users to oppose Internet regulation in Russia.

State governance of the Internet is not balanced by a separate and sometimes oppositional voice of the public in the Russian case: it is largely supported and empowered by the public. For instance, recently, the Russian ministry of communication suggested moving the management of. In light of the data outlined above, it should be no surprise that there has been no expression of opposition or protest against this move by the user community.

That said, there are some actors in Russia who vigorously oppose Internet regulation. All of these voices, however, have had very little impact on Russian policy on Internet regulation, and, it seems, little impact on Russian public opinion. In a small amount of cases, the Russian Association of Electronic Communication RAEC , which lobbies on behalf of Russian Internet companies and includes some of the leading commercial actors in Runet, has tried to oppose some of the most radical initiatives which may pose a significant threat to the business interests of Internet companies.

These efforts, however, also remain marginal, and RAEC avoids any conflict with the Russian authorities. The surveys mentioned above underscore this conclusion: those who oppose Internet regulation are marginal because they are in opposition not only to the authorities but also to the majority of public opinion. The Russian government feels free to introduce more and more initiatives to regulate the Internet not just because there is little opposition, but because it is supported by the public.

One possible implication is that those seeking to block radical initiatives for Internet regulation should shift from exclusive attention on monitoring the authorities and lamenting new restrictions and turn towards efforts to shape public opinion and engage users about the protection of Internet freedom.

To this end, it is important first to understand why the majority of the public are loyal supporters of Internet regulation and of the idea that these efforts should be led by the government. Factors in public support for Internet regulation While the data from the survey conducted by the IPO and VCIOM contradicts the assumption that the public will automatically oppose restrictive Internet regulation and online censorship, the question that needs to be asked is why the public supports such interventions.

How is the legitimacy of regulation achieved? The IPO survey provides some insights that may help us to respond to these questions. On the one hand, one can argue that there is an association between the scale of Internet usage and the attitudes toward censorship. For instance, the data from the Levada Center demonstrates that while the difference in attitudes between different age, education, and location demographics is not substantial, higher support for Internet censorship can be found among those living in big cities except Moscow , the younger group of respondents tend to support censorship more than the older group, people with higher education support 21 Nisbet, E.

In he moved with the theater troupe to Petrograd , becoming involved with the " Serapion Brothers ," a literary group including Ivanov , Zoschenko and Kaverin. In he moved to Bakhmut and began to publish satirical verse and reviews in the local newspaper. He became an author of the children's magazines Hedgehog and Siskin. In Evgeny Schwartz began collaborating with Nikolay Akimov at the Leningrad Comedy Theater, writing contemporary plays based on the folk and fairy tales of Hans Christian Andersen.

He died in Leningrad. The Dragon[ edit ] In , Schwartz completed the satirical play The Dragon, which was seen as subversive in the political climate of post-war Russia. The play tells the story of the knight Lancelot , who sets out to slay the dragon.

However, in his quest, he stumbles on a community governed by a bureaucratic hierarchy using the dragon to cover their own use of power. This play, the most "mature" of Schwartz's plays, is a political satire aimed at totalitarianism in all forms. Modernists and especially post-modernists emphasize that national identities i. Myroslav Hroch has paid particular attention to the role of cultural elites in Eastern Europe in the production and dissemination of nationalist ideas. Often contemporary scholarly assumptions constitute substantial parts of such myths.

Who are the protagonists in the Russian case? The peculiarity of the Russian case lies in the fact that politicians as conscious Russian nation-builders did not appear until relatively late. The members of the tsarist government, on the whole, were not such people. Russian nationalism had never been a state ideology of the prerevolutionary Russian government.

The fairly widely-held view that the tsars' Russification policy was applied consistently to the empire's nonRussian subjects is a myth with little substance. Yet, in the eighteenth century, Russian tsars, especially Peter and Catherine the Great, played a key role in forging the ideology of state patriotism. Some of the myths that were constructed in their propaganda campaigns were incorporated into Russian national consciousness in the nineteenth century through the efforts of intellectuals.

In its turn, the Soviet government made conscious efforts to construct a new common identity for its subjects. Therefore, if the relevant tsarist government policies are discussed fairly briefly in this book, the policies and theoretical positions of the Soviet government are allotted considerable attention. Although the proclaimed aim of the Soviet government was to create a new Soviet people out of the different subjects of the state, rather than to complete the formation of the Russian nation and to create a Russian nation-state, Russian nation-building was facilitated in the Soviet period.

As most scholars now agree, the Soviet government, probably often unwittingly, created nations on the basis of culturally defined non-Russian ethnic communities. In turn, the emergence and strengthening of nonRussian nationalisms in the s led in response to the construction of a new form of Russian nationalism, which was overtly anti-imperial. Throughout the entire period considered in this book, which begins with an analysis of the eighteenth century, the main contribution to defining what Russia is and who the Russians are has been made by intellectuals writers, poets, artists, journalists, musicians and historians.

In the prerevolutionary period, intellectuals were virtually the sole nation-builders. In the Soviet period, when the government took over the initiative in the process of identity formation, ideas that had been put forward by prerevolutionary intellectuals continued to play a very significant role.

The classical Russian literature of the nineteenth century to a very large extent shaped the views of the old Bolsheviks about their country. Throughout the Soviet period it constituted a key part of the school curriculum in the 16 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State Manchester, Manchester University Press, Introduction: Russian identity between empire and the West 9 humanities.

From the s, the main concepts of nineteenth century Russian historiography were incorporated into the official interpretation of Russian history promoted by the majority of Soviet historians. It is true that some works by important thinkers, whose careers had started before the revolution and who turned against the Bolsheviks in or soon after, were banned.

However, they began to be published again in the late s, and today they exercise a significant influence on the way not only intellectuals but also many politicians view Russia. For this reason, the deconstruction of this extremely rich intellectual and cultural tradition is the prime focus of this book. The perspective of the intelligentsia was not the only possible view of what Russia was or should be.

In addition to the Russia imagined by the Europeanized educated elite, from the eighteenth century there was the Russia of the Old Believers people who opposed the liturgical reform of the Church in the late seventeenth century and were therefore severely persecuted by the state and of the Russian peasantry, some of whom adopted the Old Belief. The fact that the Russia of Old Believers is only briefly discussed in this book should not be taken as an indication that it was unimportant.

Significantly, in the s, one of the key periods in the intellectual debate about Russianness, one of the intellectuals came across writings by Old Believers.

Evgeny Schwartz

He was astonished to discover in these writings that their authors 'have been thinking about It could not have served as a basis for constructing a modern national identity.

Those late eighteenth century Russian intellectuals, such as Nikolai Novikov and Aleksandr Radishchev, who first tried to apply the French concept of a nation to a seemingly unsuitable Russian reality, adopted a secular world view and downplayed the significance of the religious component in Russian identity.

The Westernizers of the nineteenth century did the same. It is indicative that such leading historians as Sergei Solovev and Vasilii Kliuchevskii paid little attention to Church and religion 17 18 The existence of the two distinct discourses on Russian identity back in the eighteenth century was noted by Michael Cherniavsky, 'Russia,' in Orest Ranum, ed.

XI Moscow, Sovremennik, , p. Kasianova, O russkom natsionalnom kharaktere Moscow, Institut natsionalnoi modeli ekonomiki, , p. This particularly applies to the landed gentry.

Children’s Theatre, Shvarts, and the Fairy Tale

Lotman reminds us that 'a noble landlord, who was born in' a provincial estate and spent his childhood playing with peasant children, was in constant contact with the peasant way of life' and therefore picked up many habits of the peasantry.

Lev Tolstoi was one of the key propagandists of such an image of Russia. Yet, in War and Peace, when Natasha Rostova, a young woman from a wealthy aristocratic family, puts on a Russian folk-dress and starts dancing a folkdance, her nanny, a former peasant serf, unmistakably sees in Natasha her own kith and kin. Moreover, as is the case elsewhere, some powerful symbols originating in Russian folk culture easily migrated into the nationalist discourse of the Russian elites.

The images of Holy Rus and Mother Russia have already been mentioned. In addition to these, a vision of Russia as a land without end, which first originated in folk songs, became a commonplace in intellectual discourse. The book argues that this last vision had a negative impact on nation-building, as it diminished the need to draw precise geographical boundaries for the national homeland.

Wherever possible, this book tries to assess the views of ordinary people on what it meant to be a Russian. As far as the pre-revolutionary period is concerned, it discusses how Russia and Russians are represented in folk and prison songs, short satirical poems chastushki and other genres of popular culture. With the spread of mass education in the Soviet period, the dissemination of intellectuals' and politicians' ideas concerning Russian national identity began to provoke an active response on the part of the general public.

This response became a subject of Soviet scholarship in the s and was to acquire particular significance in the period of Gorbachev's perestroika. Sharpe, , p.

Petersburg, Iskusstvo, , pp. See, for instance, L. Drobizheva, ed. Drobizheva and M. Kashuba, eds, Traditsii v sovremennom obshchestve: issledovaniia etnokulturnykh protsessov Moscow, Nauka, Introduction: Russian identity between empire and the West 11 and politicians could be tested in elections, as politicians incorporated them in their electoral platforms.

Numerous opinion polls conducted in the s specifically on questions related to Russian national identity are analysed in this book, thus making ordinary Russians today another protagonist in the story. It should be noted that the discourse on Russian identity, a key subject of this book, is largely male.

As elsewhere, most intellectuals who saw themselves as nation-builders were and still are men. This is not to say that Russian women have not contributed their own perspective on Russia. It would be an interesting task to try to identify the key texts which offer such a perspective. But the best known women intellectuals largely participated in the debate on terms laid down by men. The tone was set by Ekaterina Istomina , who although hailing Russia for starting to produce female poets Russian Sapphos , nevertheless constructed the same image of Russia as her male colleagues had done before.

Through Peter's reforms her Russia, which had been buried in darkness, was suddenly exposed to light mrachna Rossiia ozarilas. This was based on a certain vision of Russia on the part of its participants and therefore was directly relevant to the question of Russian nation-building. According to Richard Stites, '[n]o other radical movement in the West showed anything remotely close to the level of women's participation as the Russian revolutionary movement.

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Thus, in the story told in this book, the role of Russian women is the one assigned to them by men. This role is a typical one for women in other nation-building projects: they are regarded as 'the breeders' of the nation, as they socialize children into national culture.

They are also perceived as the passive symbols of the nation. Russian intellectuals themselves, especially Nikolai Berdiaev, argued that such images had a particularly strong impact on their perception of Russia.

I think they were right. It is not so much that in Russian literature we find many instances where the expression 'Mother Russia' is used or that a peasant woman is evoked as a symbol of Russianness. A more original feature of Russian discourse are instances when in a particular text Russia as a woman is addressed directly and the addresser is clearly anticipating an answer. Among many, a famous passage from Gogol's Dead 22 23 24 Catriona Kelly, ed. Richard Stites, 'Women and the Russian Intelligentsia.

What do you want of me? What unthinkable bond hides between us? Why do you look at me so? Another possible perspective on Russia stemmed from the multi-ethnic character of the Russian state.

From the s onwards non-Russians, who valued the distinctiveness of their own cultural and religious traditions, began to challenge the view of Russia advanced by intellectuals whose perspective was exclusively Russian.

These non-Russian views of Russia deserve a separate serious study. Given the nature of this book, the views of non-Russian intellectuals are acknowledged only where they were noticed by Russian intellectuals, which happened, it seems, all too rarely. The outline of the argument Scholars see the 'making of nations' as a process determined by certain social, economic and political conditions, which is also 'conceived and articulated in an emerging national discourse.

The membership of a nation can also be redefined and the borders of a national homeland redrawn. When this happens, it is always a major dramatic political event. In twentieth century Russian history this has happened twice - in in the course of the Russian revolution and in when the USSR disintegrated. Following the revolution, the Bolshevik government was able to recreate the state almost within the same borders as those of the Russian empire.

It thereby postponed any solution of the question about the actual boundaries of the Russian national homeland. In , Russia's borders shrank almost to those of Muscovy at the end of the sixteenth century. As a result, over 25 million Russians found themselves living outside the borders of the new Russian state.

The question of who belongs to the Russian nation and where 'the just' borders of the Russian nation-state should be is much less clear today in the case of Russia than in other European nations. Suny, Revenge of the Past, p. Introduction: Russian identity between empire and the West 13 the current state of Russian nation-building, one Russian scholar has argued that the Russians 'stopped at the threshold separating ethnic from nation.

In the writings of Russian intellectuals in we find a description of Russia as a phantom, of a Russia which unexpectedly disintegrated like a house of cards.

How is this incompleteness of the Russian nation-building project to be explained? A number of students of Russia see the key explanation in a peculiarity of Russian state-building - the absence of the political, social and economic conditions necessary for nation-building. Back in Hans Rogger argued that whereas elsewhere in Europe, in the course of the nineteenth century, 'nationalist sentiments, ideologies and movements had helped to throw bridges across conflicts of class and religion, had created common bonds between individuals and groups and had reconciled society and its members to the state to a surprising degree,' this did not happen in Russia.

Not only it did not apply the policy of Russification of non-Russians consistently, it even did not launch a comprehensive programme of turning Russian peasants into citizens. The tsarist government could not organize compulsory mass education for peasants following the emancipation of serfs quickly enough to have ensured that they were better integrated into society by the start of World War I. Other scholars, most notably Roman Szporluk and Hosking, further developed Rogger's argument.

Szporluk thought that the ethnic identity of the Russians had been blurred by the fact that their empire had been created at an early period, and that the colonies were separated neither geographically nor politically from the metropolis.

This made it unclear where the borders of the Russian national homeland should be. Furthermore, the Georgiy I. Mirsky, On Ruins of Empire. Ibid, pp. Until the early twentieth century, its members were not admitted into governing the country.

At that time, the tsarist government launched a programme of industrialization, but it was still hesitant in introducing the political liberties which elsewhere in Europe accompanied the advent of capitalism. Moreover, by the time the tsarist government embarked on economic reforms at the end of the nineteenth century, most Russian intellectuals had embraced the ideas of socialism, rather than of liberal nationalism, Szporluk argued.

The socialist approach meant that the upper classes of society were excluded from membership of the Russian nation. In , the victory of the Bolshevik Party led to attempts to put this concept of a national community into practice.

The internationalist rather than nationalist world view of socialists helped the Bolsheviks justify the recreation of the Russian empire in the form of the USSR. Within the framework of this new state, the government's nationalities policies did not greatly assist the Russians in defining the borders of their ethnic homeland clearly.

Hosking also agreed that Russian state-building had a negative effect on the Russian nation-building project. Analysing the pre-revolutionary period, he argued that the early creation of a huge land-based empire, the maintenance of which required too many economic sacrifices on the part of the Russians, resulted in the perpetuation of centralized autocratic government.

Fearful of losing control over the country, the government hesitated to modernize it through political and economic reforms which would have facilitated the Russian nation-building process. From the early twentieth century, some Russian intellectuals began to blame themselves rather than the government for the fact that their ideas were so clearly failing to become a unifying force in society and to bring about the reconciliation between society and the state.

Not surprisingly, this criticism began after the tsarist government had allowed the election of the first Russian parliament and introduced some other liberalizing reforms. In the collection of essays Signposts Vekhi , former socialists who had embraced the ideas of liberal nationalism attacked their fellow intellectuals for cosmopolitanism, infatuation with the West, disregard of indigenous Russian traditions and indifference or even outright hostility to the state and its policies, even when those were beneficial for the country.

In the aftermath of the October Revolution, some of the contributors to the collection published a follow-up volume, De Profundis Iz glubiny. This blamed the Bolshevik takeover partly on the ideas of the pre-revolutionary socialist, anti-national, intelligentsia and its 30 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire.

Introduction: Russian identity between empire and the West 15 rejection of the path of cooperation with the government. This line of argument has been supported by some Western scholars, most notably Richard Pipes.

Prior to the government perpetuated a premodern dynastic empire, and subsequently the Bolsheviks created the USSR, which claimed to be supra-national. At the same time, I argue that the intelligentsia has to share with the government some responsibility for the Russians' failure to form a fully-fledged nation.

However, the intelligentsia's failure lies not where its early twentieth century critics found it, but elsewhere. The continued criticism of government policies by intellectuals following the October manifesto was hardly a decisive reason for the Russian revolution and the subsequent failure to create a civic nation out of the empire's subjects.

This book argues that the very way in which Russian nationalist discourse was constructed by Russian intellectuals from the late eighteenth century on had a negative effect on the Russian nation-building process.

The way Russia was imagined by Russian intellectuals in the pre-revolutionary period had a very profound impact on educated Russians in the nineteenth century, on the broader Russian public in the twentieth century and on the Soviet government. The Soviet government position on the nature of the Russian state from the mids onwards owed a lot to the prerevolutionary tradition.

But the Russia of the pre-revolutionary intellectual tradition proved to be an imaginary rather than an imagined community. Two particularly important views concerning the Russian national identity, formulated by pre-revolutionary Russian intellectuals, turned out to be dysfunctional. The first was the idea that only the toiling Russian people could belong to the nation, whereas the upper classes should be excluded.

Szporluk has attributed this view to Russian socialists. However, it was first formulated not by them, but by the Slavophiles of the s. It then started to be shared by intellectuals and cultural figures of different political orientations.

For the Slavophiles, it was only the peasantry, as the bearer of an indigenous Russian tradition, which could rightfully constitute the Russian nation. In contrast, the elites had to be excluded, because they were corrupted by Western influences. In turn, Russian socialists included either only the peasantry or the peasantry and the workers in the Russian nation. They excluded the upper classes from membership of the nation because they exploited the labour of and otherwise mistreated the lower classes.

This position not only reflected the existing divide between the upper and lower classes in Russian society, but also constantly reinforced it and, in effect, stultified the process of building a modern nation in Russia. German Romantics, whose ideas about the true Volk as a bearer of 'national spirit' inspired the Slavophiles, did not go as far as to exclude educated Germans from membership of the German nation. Moreover, in the French tradition of the second half of the nineteenth century, which had an impact on Russian Westernizers, the discourse about the nation classified the peasantry as not fully French.

A comprehensive programme was launched to turn them into Frenchmen, particularly by making them learn the language and culture of Paris. As the Slavophile historian Mikhail Pogodin put it, the Russian people are 'marvellous, but marvellous so far only in potential.

This elitist view of the people, which freely co-existed in Russian intellectual thought with the egalitarian one, became a justification for dictatorship in the twentieth century. The second idea was that the entire multi-ethnic tsarist empire was the Russian nation-state. This idea was articulated by Russian intellectuals in an attempt to apply the West European concept of a nation to Russian reality.

This view of Russia reflected the personal experience of those who articulated it. Those intellectuals who first formulated it in the late eighteenth century and then developed it more fully in the nineteenth, were members of the intellectual elite residing in the two capitals, St.

Petersburg and Moscow. This elite was multi-ethnic, with Ukrainians and Russified Germans playing a particularly important role. This vision of Russia was confirmed by its members' own success in integration where they were not ethnic Russians. However, it did not necessarily correspond to the experience of Russian and non-Russian peasants, who continued to identify with the places where they were born and lived. It also did not correspond to the vision of Russia of those educated non-Russians, whose loyalty to their ethnic groups was stronger than the identification with the entire state.

Indeed, in the course of the nineteenth century, this vision of the entire empire as a Russian nation-state proved to be blatantly at odds with reality. In fact, the Russians did not have their own nation-state. They probably did 32 33 James R.

Lehning, Peasant and French. Quoted in Nicholas V. By the late nineteenth century, Great Russians constituted 44 per cent of the country's population. It was manifested in the fact that the per capita expenditure on police was far higher in the non-Russian provinces than in Russian areas, and that the military assumed a large part of the responsibility for ruling Russia's borderlands.

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The ethnic diversity of the peoples that the West European nationbuilders had to fuse into one nation was much lower. But most Russian intellectuals, conservatives and liberals alike, did not grasp this problem. Even when the challenge of non-Russian nationalisms from the midnineteenth century onwards began to show that their concept of the Russian nation-state was not viable, they stuck to it.

This is because their main point of comparison remained the West, and this perspective allowed the Russians simply to ignore the arguments of non-Russian nationalists. When in it turned out that the Russian nation with a strong state did not exist, many were devastated.

The behaviour of the non-Russians, especially the Ukrainians, was incomprehensible to them. Bolshevik policies served to restore that state, and this made many of their initial opponents among Russian nationalists come to terms with the new regime. Similarly, as the disintegration of the USSR loomed in , many anti-Soviet Russian nationalists again struck an alliance with the Communists.

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